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Romania and Moldova are situated in the strategically important Black Sea region which has 
a long history of competing and clashing interests of Russia and Western powers. This 
location has had dramatic effect on the formulation and changes of Romanian and Moldovan 
strategic culture and on their unique symbiosis, a reactive inter-relatedness in security 
consciousness and identity. Apart from the fact that changes in either country’s strategic 
behavior likely launch responses in the other, due to the overlapping conceptions of national 
identity these changes bear relevance on the domestic power-play of strategic subcultures.  
 
Strategic culture in this article is perceived as a discursive construct. Thus, we capitalize, on 
the one hand, on Bloomfields’ notion of the competition of different security conceptions of 
domestic subcultures, and on the theory of inter-subjectivity of institutional structures and 
identities, presented by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner.1 Based on 
these worthy starting points, we complement the discussion with the idea of interactive 
dynamics of immediate and wider regional security environments, which are sometimes 
converging but often colliding, characteristically fluid contexts. In contrast to the international 
arena, the immediate security environment can be perceived as an extended national space that 
is situated beyond the actual state boundaries. Since the image of this territory is a central 
building block of identity substantiating the myth of the nation’s rightful homeland,2 threat 
perceptions also cover these areas. This extended spatial scope is not a buffer-zone but a core 
 
territory of identity. We argue that this notion of the national domain, relying on historical 
reference points and emotionally loaded values, is shared by the different subcultures. 
 
We distinguish between long-term strategic culture, which defines the principles and primary 
goals of national security, and short-term strategic behavior which is designed to realize the 
main goals of strategic culture. Thus, strategic behavior is more time bound and sensitive to 
transformations in the security environment. Long-term strategic culture, similarly to national 
identity, is not monolithic but a subject of continuous interaction and discursive co-
construction. This process is based on the historical layers of threat concepts and their 
interpretations by different subcultures. 
 
This analysis of strategic culture goes beyond the limited angle of military security and 
underlines a wider concept of security – also reflected by focal security documents and 
speeches. The paramount security concern of Romania and Moldova is to safeguard the 
territorial integrity of the nation-state. The perception of the nation-state in both countries is 
related to a) the notion of the ideal state, b) the multi-ethnic make-up of Romania and 
Moldova, and c) the transformations in these countries’ immediate and regional security 
environment. We argue that while all these aspects are interlinked there is, however, an inner 
hierarchy where the ideal state appears to be the long-term consensual goal of the different 
political elites’ subcultures. The dream of the ideal state has however not always converged 
historically with the de facto state boundaries. Hence, in order to achieve the ideal state as 
principal goal, strategies had to be adjusted to the domestic, regional and international 
contexts at any one time. The most troublesome task in the domestic context is to counter-
balance the multi-ethnic reality with the concept of the nation-state. This aspect is also deeply 
connected to regional contradictions since minority issues bundle up the neighboring 
 
countries and challenge the nation state paradigm, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. 
From the point of view of achieving the ideal state, the international context is also relevant 
because it provides a sometimes friendly sometimes hostile environment for it. Thus, while 
deciding on feasible and efficient strategic behavior patterns, the elites have to take into 
consideration simultaneously the domestic, regional and international contexts. 
 
The main actor of the regional and international arena is obviously Russia. It has played a 
central role in how the understanding of the ideal state was created in Romania and Moldova, 
partly because the very existence of these countries was initially dependent on the Russian 
intentions around the Black Sea. For that reason, Russia tends to dominate the main threat 
perceptions of these countries. 
 
 
The Russian Input in the Origins of State-hood 
 
The Romanian and Moldovan bilateral relations look back on a mutually debated history. 
Moldova was originally part of the Romanian principality Moldavia, called Bessarabia.3 The 
Romanian principalities, Moldavia and Walachia, were under Ottoman suzerainty from the 
16th century. The colliding strategic interests over the Black Sea region finally culminated in 
the Ottoman-Russian war, which resulted in the Russian invasion of Bessarabia in 1812. From 
that time on, the possession of Bessarabia moved back and forth between Russia and the 
Romanian principality of Moldavia. 
 
Russia grew into a significant regional player in the Black Sea area in the 19th century. While 
France and Britain tried to preserve the Ottoman Empire, in order to, avoid the Black Sea 
 
region falling under Russian domination, it was increasingly turning into a wearisome 
endeavor. Thus, after the Crimean war (1853–1856), to counterbalance Russia, the Western 
powers started to support the rise of a new state: the unification of the Romanian 
Principalities as Romania, in 1859. The West gradually begun to favor the idea to push the 
Ottoman empire back to Asia Minor, thus, when Russia participated in this mission (the 
Balkan wars, 1877–1878), it was rewarded with Bessarabia. While the new Romanian 
kingdom, recognized by the international community in 1881, was becoming an important 
Black Sea bridgehead for Western, especially French interests, Bessarabia was expendable 
from the Western point of view. Romania was, however, substituted for Bessarabia with 
Southern Dobrogea, taken from Bulgaria, thus, acquiring a larger share of the seaside. 
 
During the First World War, Romanian forces ended the war on the side of the victorious 
powers in 1918. An equally important strategic decision was the Romanian involvement in 
the intervention in Soviet-Russia where Romania saw the opportunity to regain Bessarabia.4 
When Soviet-type revolutions broke out in the neighboring Hungary and Slovakia, Romanian 
forces marched to Budapest. These strategic maneuvers were rewarded in the Versailles Peace 
Settlements (1919–1920) by transferring Transylvania from Hungary, and recognizing the 
reunification of Bessarabia with Romania. 
 
The decision to unite with Romania was adopted in May 1918 by the Moldovan Country 
Council (Sfatul Țării) in Chisinau, putting an end to the short-lived independence of the 
Moldavian Republic, proclaimed in January 1918. Opinions about unification were far from 
unanimous. As the French consular agent in Chișinău reported: 
"… the Country Council voted with 86 votes for, 3 against and 36 
abstentions (13 absent) the reunification of Bessarabia to Romania [...] 
 
Despite the propaganda employed and the amounts spent, there was a strong 
opposition. [...] the majority, in favor of the unification, was rather weak. I 
am convinced that the voted unification is not on the will of the majority of 
the population in Chisinau; or the Moldovan element is neither very large 
nor very active.”5 
 
The city of Chișinău was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-confessional locality with the 
Romanians accounting for only 41% of the population, while the rest was made up of Jews 
(37%), Russians (17%) and a number of other nationalities, most of which regarded Russia as 
their motherland.6 Lenin’s speeches after the Bolshevik Revolution promising social and 
national freedoms nurtured hopes in Bessarabia. It opened a cleavage between the supporters 
of unification and the advocates of autonomy within Red or White Russia or even Ukraine.7 
Almost immediately after the unification, the Committee for the Salvation of Bessarabia was 
established to co-ordinate the activities designed to return Bessarabia to Russia.8 The 
unification was also denounced by the Ukrainian authorities and both sides of the Russian 
civil war. 
 
The Romanian dream of the ideal state came true but the perceptions of what might constitute 
an ideal state for Moldova turned out to be on a collision course with the Romanian idea.  
 
 
The contradicting ideals: Greater Romania or Independent Moldova 
 
The Greater Romania of the interwar period is still remembered in the National Security 
Strategy documents in the 1990s and 2000s as the golden age of modern societal development 
 
relying on an active and assertive foreign policy, able to alter the immediate security 
environment.9 The strategic principles and threat perceptions of the interwar period became 
the cornerstones of long-term strategic culture, relying on wide domestic consensus. The 
primary concern was to safeguard the territorial integrity of Greater Romania, thus, the main 
strategy was to get Western powers involved in the regional protection of the country against 
Soviet-Russia and the neighboring revanchist Hungary and Bulgaria. 
 
Romania saw France as an important ally which showed after WWI a growing interest in the 
East Central European region. France launched a novel strategic defense system, the Little 
Entente, Alliance de revers and Cordon Sanitaire, combing Romania, and the new states, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The mutual aim of all these countries was to prevent border 
revisions, detain German influence, and stop the spread of communist experiments, which 
determined the Romanian-Soviet relations during the whole interwar period.10 
 
Between 1919 and 1924, there appeared several attempts to oust the Romanian authorities 
from Bessarabia, culminating with the peasant revolt in Tatar Bunar in September 1924.11 The 
following month (12 October 1924) the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee decided to 
establish the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a part of the Ukrainian 
SSR. The new Republic, which resembled with present day Transnistria, became the cradle of 
Moldovianism, a state-invented and state-manufactured national ideology.12 The Romanian 
dialect spoken in the area was now renamed as the Moldovan language, and the Latin 
alphabet was changed into Cyrillic. 
 
The Second World War modified the regional chessboard considerably. The Red Army seized 
Bessarabia in 1940 and maintained it until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the 
 
WWII, Bessarabia was now recognized as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
independent from its previous host, the Ukrainian SSR. The old tsarist practice of 
Russification was applied during the Stalinist years, aiming to strengthen a distinct Moldovan 
identity in order to ensure that Romania could not reclaim this area ever again. The ethnic 
make-up was altered radically by moving Russian population in.13 Ethnic Russians became 
the trusted political elite with central economic positions governing the indigenous 
population. 
 
The communist take-over in the aftermath of the WWII had severe impact on Romanian 
development as well. National interest, let alone the dreams of Greater Romania had to be 
buried in the Eastern Bloc, at least during the Stalinist years. In 1958, the withdrawal of the 
Soviet army troops from Romanian soil eventually transformed the situation and the 
communist leadership launched a new independence-seeking foreign policy line. This 
culminated in 1968 with the Warsaw Pact’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia that the 
Nicolae Ceausescu administration (1965–1989) publicly condemned and declared a new 
security doctrine: the defense of Romania’s territorial integrity by the entire people (i.e., 
enrolling women into the army).14 From that time on, Romania became a maverick and strong 
opponent of Soviet interests, earning thus the support of the United States. These special ties 
with the USA were reawakened in the post-communist period and a strategic partnership was 
established in 1997.15 In the 1980s, however, the independence-seeking Ceausescu-line turned 
equally against Western criticism of human rights violations in communist Romania – that 
was interpreted as interference in domestic matters. Eventually, this turned into the 
international isolation of the country. 
 
 
Interlinked with the drive for independence and detachment from the control of Moscow and 
the Eastern Bloc, the Ceausescu regime developed a unique nationalist communist system and 
kept hence the national sentiment alive. After the collapse of communism in 1989, the 
majority of the new parties grouped up with the old, Greater Romania dream, inherited from 
the interwar period.16 There was even a new political force called the ‘Greater Romania Party’ 
that grew into the second largest party by the parliamentary elections in 2000. 
 
Moldova unfortunately did not share a common national sentiment with Romania but 
developed its own. The Stalinist nation-building formula actually worked so well that by the 
time of the dissolution of the USSR, the Moldovans wanted to remain independent. This 
attitude interestingly did not change over the decades: according to an opinion poll in 2018, 
still only 25 % of the population voted for reunification with Romania.17 In August 1991, the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova changed its name to the Republic of Moldova and it 
seemed for a moment that the Moldovan ideal state now became a reality. The Transnistrians 
were however unhappy with the new situation the disintegrating Soviet Union created for 
them. The conflict itself revealed the fundamental problem of this region: multiethnic 
composition not only threatened the territorial integrity of the countries and undermined the 
nation-state driven aspirations, but even more importantly, it offered Russia the pretext to 
interfere and destabilize the domestic power balance. 
 
 
Multi-ethnic challenge of territorial integrity 
 
 
The biggest internal threat to these multiethnic countries has been the principle of self-
determination based on ethnic grounds – an underlying concern which Russia was 
traditionally well aware of, and Moldova was historically an easy target.  
 
Bessarabia of the interwar period had a mixed population out of which only 56% were 
Romanians, over a third Slavonic (13% Russian, 12% Ukrainian, 6% Bulgarian, etc.) and 7% 
Jewish. This composition resembled, on the one hand, the differences in ethnicity, languages 
and identities of the Western parts of the Russian Empire, but also the Russification policy 
which was well under way before the Bolshevik revolution.18 After the reunification with 
Greater Romania, the Bolshevik leadership of Soviet Russia made attempts to stir a 
revolutionary movement in Romania by exploiting the independence-seekers and Slavonic 
ethnic groups in Bessarabia.19 Furthermore, both the Komintern and the Balkan Communist 
Federation openly advocated the disintegration of Romania, considered as a multi-national 
state, by returning Bessarabia and attributing Bucovina to Soviet Russia, annexing Dobrogea 
to Bulgaria and Transylvania to Hungary – based on the idea of self-determination of the 
nations.20 
 
Ironically, after WWII and the communist take-over in Eastern Europe, the Soviet policy 
started to discourage the principle of self-determination, which suited well also the new 
communist regime in Romania. As mentioned earlier, especially the Ceausescu administration 
furthered national unity and institutionalized Romanian nationalism based on the idea of one 
homogeneous nation.21 After the communist collapse in 1989, the national ideology, designed 
during state socialism, survived serving now the purposes of the Greater Romania plan. 
 
 
On the eve of the systemic change and the break-up of the USSR in 1990, Moldovan society 
began debating the future scenarios of the identity of the state. The core question was should 
Moldova remain independent or reunite with Romania. The Popular Front, which was 
previously a movement supporting Gorbatchev’s Perestroika, became the central political 
force during the change of power, 1989–1990. The Popular Front campaigned for 
reintroducing Romanian as the official language and returning to the Latin alphabet. The 
radical wing of the Front even advocated for reunification with Romania. The Popular Front 
acquired 40 % in the first parliamentary elections in March 1990 and thus became the major 
political force in the country. The new symbols of the state, adopted by the Parliament in 
April 1990, closely resembled the Romanian flag, coat of arms and national anthem. These 
were threatening signs from the Russian minority’s point of view. 
 
The Transnistrians claimed that the Unionist wing was becoming a dominant force within the 
Popular Front and driving a quick reunification. The Transnistrian population was more 
mixed than any other part of Moldova: combining an almost equally third share of Moldovans 
(Romanians), Russians and Ukrainians. The previous communist regime had guaranteed the 
Russians’ leading positions in political and economic life. It was obvious that the Russians 
were about to lose their power-positions, even if Moldova stayed independent from Romania. 
Hence, the Transnistrian still communist leadership exploited the Moldovan debates and the 
Russian minority’s sense of insecurity and declared the secession in June 1990, with the new 
name of the Dnestr Moldovan Republic (Transnistria or Pridnestrovje).22 
 
Two years of violent war followed between uneven forces: the new Moldovan Republic, 
lacking yet a national army and relying on police forces, faced the 14th Soviet Army, still in 
Moldovan territory, siding with the ethnic Russian separatists. The ceasefire was finally 
 
signed in June 1992 – emblematically by the Moldovan and Russian presidents. Russian 
‘peacekeeping’ troops, however, stayed in Transnistria, bearing consequence on Moldova’s 
security perceptions and territorial integrity. The Transnistrian power elite, on the other hand, 
confident in Russian support, has had a strong negotiating position and much less incentives 
to reach compromise. 
 
The problem of Transnistria is a core question in the Moldovan strategic culture, affecting 
central debates amongst subcultures and causing continuous fluctuations in strategic behavior. 
Indirectly, the Transnistria-issue modified the security considerations and national interest 
also in Romania. Transnistria is generally referred to as a ‘frozen conflict’ and compared to 
other similar examples in post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia, and 
lately to the Crimea, where characteristically Russia has been taking advantage of unresolved 
minority disputes in relatively small countries.23 
 
 
Multilevel-game in the security environment 
 
Post-communist democratic transition created enormous political and social challenges for 
Romania, affecting also the priorities of security assessment. The problem was that after the 
isolationist policy of the Ceausescu regime in the 1980s, the complete web of foreign 
relations had to be re-established. It was actually a unique setback in comparison to other 
post-communist East Central European countries that were able to develop lasting relations 
especially with the West already in the communist era. It was also obvious that new 
alignment would inevitably influence the identity of the country. Some scholars claim that the 
Romanian strategic culture underwent a decisive transformation by the dedicated Euro-
 
Atlanticism.24 We argue, however, that what appeared to be a significant turn was actually 
consistent with the long-term strategic culture aiming to secure the territorial integrity of the 
nation and restore Greater Romania. What has changed was mostly strategic behavior that 
became innovative and bold, although oscillating somewhat with the political attachments of 
the different administrations’ subcultures. 
 
The changes in the immediate security environment in the Balkans had vital effects on the 
Romanian Euro-Atlantic orientation from the mid-1990s onwards. The violent dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was a threatening example of what the failure of a multiethnic state could cause. 
In addition, the Hungarian national-conservative administrations (1990–1994, 1998–2002, 
2010– ) openly supported territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority (about 8 % of the 
population) living in Transylvania and granted double citizenship in 2010.25 Thus, these 
regional threats were reflected in the first security document in 1991 where national security 
meant primarily internal social peace and political stability of the multiethnic state.26 The 
Romanian administrations, although strongly anchored in the national agenda (1990–1996), 
started to develop a new strategic behavior pattern, designed to preserve territorial integrity 
and the precept of the unity of the nation. The main principle was to get the regional and the 
wider international environments to overlap: thus, the task ahead was to magnify the 
Romanian security concerns in a way that important Western allies would equally realize 
these worries as general common threats for all in the alliance. 
 
The first new strategy was The Integrated Concept on National Security of Romania in 1994. 
This document was still inconclusive as to whether Romania would fully integrate with 
Western institutions or continue to balance between East and West.27 This hesitation was 
partly due to the fact that the Iliescu-administration (1990–1996) was characteristically the 
 
successor of the communist party, hence, the central security conceptions were still anchored 
to those traditional institutions and areas where the communist-time diplomacy was 
successful. Thus, particularly the United Nations, but also the renewed OSCE (Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe) with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe stood 
out as the cornerstones of Romanian security. The strength of these institutions was based on 
their multilateral negotiating power which provided a safe arena for the smaller states to be 
heard. Yet, these institutions were unable to offer security guarantees for the individual states. 
The Romanian administration started to search for more credible security-provider 
institutions, and signed in January 1994 ‘The Partnership for Peace Program’ to follow the 
trends of European, and particularly regional developments of the time. 
 
Following the 1996 elections, which ousted the ex/post-communist party from power and 
finally speeded up the transition to a Western type of democratization, the strategic goals 
changed accordingly. During the period of Emil Constantinescu’s presidency (1996–2000) the 
Center-Right governments embarked on a definite Western path, which led the to the 
country’s integration to the NATO (2004) and the EU (2007). In addition to the drive to the 
Euro-Atlantic communities, the Romanian leadership accentuated the special importance of 
bilateral relations with the US by establishing the “Strategic partnership” with the US (since 
1997) as the third most important guarantor of the country’s integrity. After the accession to 
the NATO and ensuring the continuity of strong bilateral relations with the US,28 the security-
focus changed: concentrating now on the regional framework.29 The recalibration of national 
interest and the new strategic orientation was revealed in the National Defense Strategy in 
2010, emphasizing also Romania’s pro-active international role.30 The Romanian strategic 
behavior, indeed, evolved especially in the Black Sea area. 
 
 
The current National Strategy for 2015–2019, subtitled as ‘A strong Romania in Europe and 
the world’, underlined the same development.31 While reassuring the Western orientation as 
an important security objective it, nevertheless, returned to accentuating again the Black Sea 
Region. The key goal to consolidate regional security was by promoting relations with 
countries situated on the Eastern belt of the NATO. Concerns over the increasingly instable 
area led to the re-evaluation of the relative weight of available security-provider institutions 
for strategic interests. Thus, NATO and particularly the USA are estimated as primarily 
important for Romanian security, favored markedly over other institutions such as the EU, 
UN and the OSCE.32 Romania has been eager to group up with NATO-views already during 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and addressed full commitment to the non-recognition 
policy with regard to the Russian annexation of the Crimea. The recent crisis in the vicinity of 
Romania lends a stronger role to the country to be played out skillfully in the Black Sea 
region. The aim to become the leading state in the area is dependent on the loyal and reliable 
image of Romania in front of its major Western allies. Strategic trustworthiness is, however, 
not necessarily sufficient. The unfavorable reputation of the democracy problems, 
centralization of power, erosion of the rule of law and corruption scandals of the current left-
wing administration (in power since 2016) may likely affect Western attitudes towards 
Romanian strategic goals.33 
 
The focal importance of the Black Sea in the Romanian security perceptions is mainly rooted 
in and influenced by the troubled history of Romanian-Soviet relations. Officially, the USSR 
was Romania’s neighbor on the Dniester between 1922 and 1940 and on the Prut from 1940 
to 1941 and from 1944 to 1991. The annexation of Bessarabia in 1940 and the communist 
take-over following the WWII, in addition to the subsequent clashes between Communist 
Romania and the Soviet leadership from the 1960s onwards, left an unassailable mark on the 
 
strategic culture. Despite customary tensions generated by the status of Romanian minorities 
in Ukraine, all the political parties are aware of the fact that having a sovereign Ukraine at the 
country’s Eastern border and keeping Moldova gravitating around Romania provides a better 
security environment than adjoining the Russian Federation. 
 
Current Romanian relations with Ukraine are based on the 1997 bilateral treaty which was 
signed despite the ardent criticism from the nationalist parties of both sides. The ongoing war 
in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 induced new Romanian enthusiasm for increasing the presence 
of NATO. Simultaneously, the relations especially with the US became very cordial. 
Furthermore, Romania started to approach other countries situated in the ‘threat belt’, in other 
words, in the vicinity of Russia: the Baltic countries and Poland. The Polish Trimarium 
incentive,34 aiming to construct a new type of collaboration between the states around the 
Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Adriatic Sea received wide support in Romania, relying on a rare 
consensus of different political forces. 
 
 
’One nation two states’: Romanian Diaspora-politics 
 
In the heated and formative years of 1989–1990, when Nicolae Ceaușescu’s national-
communists were ousted from power in Romania and the Republic of Moldova separated 
from the USSR, debates ensued about the re-unification of the two countries. Romania was 
the first state to officially recognize the independence of Moldova, thus, no common strategy 
was devised to follow in the footsteps of German reunification. Grass-root initiatives emerged 
though, such as the mass-demonstration along the bank of the Prut river, separating Romania 
and Moldova, in May 1990 called „the Bridge of Flowers” (‘podul de flori’). These public 
 
statements, however, did not affect the decision-makers in Bucharest and Chișinău. By 1994, 
Moldova gradually abandoned the unification orientation of its foreign policy and tried to 
adapt to new regional and European developments.35 
 
A Bessarabian by birth, the liberal President Emil Constantinescu (1996–2000) failed to 
devise a foreign policy concept capable of enhancing the relations with the Republic of 
Moldova, although at times, members of his coalition and nationalist opposition parties, such 
as the Greater Romania Party led by the extremist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, continued to 
harbour unionist feelings. President Constantinescu repeatedly called for the withdrawal of 
the 14th Russian Army from Transnistria, for example. There is, nevertheless, a gradual 
change of heart in this matter. From 1999 on, the Romanian strategy-documents contained 
concerns about Moldova as a founding pillar of strategic interest.36 Furthering close bilateral 
relations has relied on strong consensus among the different political parties and thus the 
changes of administrations have not affected this mutual agreement over primary national 
interest. Already in 2001, the successor President Traian Băsescu, initiated with his Moldovan 
counterpart a strategic partnership aiming at EU integration of the Republic of Moldova.37 
Following the NATO and the EU accession, Romania started to build a more coherent policy 
towards Moldova. 
 
Still, it was only as late as 2009 when the Romanian interests met a more favourable reception 
in Moldova to facilitate the obtaining of Romanian citizenship by Moldovan applicants – 
resulting in 800,000 Moldovans acquiring Romanian citizenship almost immediately. Various 
agreements paved the way for this policy in the fields transportation, energy, education, 
culture, in addition to numerous funding schemes channelled to local administrations’ 
projects. Still, the Romanian administration has acknowledged the fact that a quarter of the 
 
total population of Moldova would support the unification with Romania, while more than 
60% would vote against it.38 
 
Romania is, however, at the crossroads. Nationalist organizations in Romania and Moldova 
support reunification, while the liberal pro-EU parties in both countries vote for the idea of 
one nation in two states, also within the EU. On the other hand, Moldova is divided between 
left-wing and communist pro-Russian parties, represented now by the current President Igor 
Dodon (in office since 2016), and the liberal pro-European government. Thus, the unification 
prospect seems as distant as ever while the European integration is perhaps a chimera. This is 
reflected in the Romanian National Strategy issued for 2015–2019, where special regard is 
given to the bonds with the Republic of Moldova, but they are defined rather in the meaning 
of two Romanian states in a common European Union than in terms of state unification as in 
1918.39 Nevertheless, a special National Strategy addressing the Romanian diaspora was also 
created in May 2017 for the period of 2017–2020.40 The Romanian-speaking population 
living abroad displays diversity in their relations to the Romanian state. On one hand, there 
are Romanian communities with historical bonds with the ancient Principality of Moldova – 
combining the citizens of the present Republic of Moldova, Northern Bukovina and Southern 
Bessarabia, now parts of Ukraine. An equally important group is the so-called Vlachs’ 
communities living in the neighboring Balkan countries, in Serbia, Greece or Bulgaria with 
no direct bonds to the Romanian state.41 The National strategy lists four key objectives 
designed to keep up, develop and affirm the Romanian identity of diasporas, consolidate the 
Romanian organizations abroad, and defend their rights in their host countries. 
 
 
The Moldovan Ideal State Between Russia and the West 
 
 
The changing Moldovan administrations have been painstakingly aware of the fact that their 
country is the subject of clashing interests of Russia and the EU, with a mutually exclusive 
effort to integrate the country either to the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union or by signing 
the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement offered 
by the EU.42 From the Moldovan point of view, the leading elite is hesitant because 
proceeding with the Eastern Partnership scheme of the EU can cause difficulties in the 
relationship with Russia. A reminder of how severe the effects can be, came in 2014 when 
Moldova joined the EU’s sanctions towards Russia due to the Ukraine-crisis. Russia reacted 
instantly by banning Moldovan agricultural products and refusing to renew work permits for 
Moldovan employees working in Russia.43 Migrating to work to other countries (Russia and 
the EU) and sending financial aid back home is a significant economic asset for the poorest 
country in Europe. The Word Bank estimates that in 2014 almost 25 percent of Moldova’s 
GDP was formed by the remittances of the migrant workers.44 
 
These actions revealed the wider security concerns related to economic relations. Besides 
obvious security concerns, Russia nevertheless is an important trade partner and energy 
supplier for Moldova. Actually, Russia is Moldova’s second largest export destination after 
Romania, although approximately 62 % of Moldovan export goes to the EU.45 Moldova’s 
energy consumption is about 95 percent dependent on Russian supplies. To counterbalance 
this unfavorable position, the current pro-West Government (in office since 2014) launched a 
new strategy to increase the share of renewable energy resources up to 20 percent of total 
consumption by the 2020, relying on EU funds in the endeavor.46 This difficult in-between 
position, divided by dependencies and interests, can create extra pressures for Moldova when 
a crisis situation emerges in the immediate security environment. The growing threats due to 
 
the continuing heated war in the Donbass and the seizure of the Crimea led to a peculiar 
political solution in 2016. The pro-Russian Igor Dodon was elected as president in November 
2016 while the Government is furthering a characteristically pro-Western policy.47 
 
Moldovan strategic behavior has been testing new patterns to find ways to come to terms with 
Transnistrian leadership. Trade between the two started to grow particularly after Moldova 
signed the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
with the EU in 2014.48 Transnistria became eager to take advantage and be incorporated to the 
Moldovan deal, which was in fact successful because between 2014 and 2016, the 
Transnistrian export grew over 70 % with Moldova and the EU. Similarly, in 2016, 38 
percent of Transnistria’s export went to Russia or to Eurasian Economy Union whereas 57 
percent was directed to the EU.49 Thus, especially trade interactions revealed the ‘behind the 
scenes’ -type of negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria – trying to avoid Russian 
interference. In contrast to the continuous rivalry between the domestic pro-Russian and pro-
Western political forces in Moldova, Transnistria is while outspokenly pro-Russian, 
nevertheless, it is showing economic pragmatism. Transnistria joined the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement with the EU in 2016.50 By cooperating with both 
Russia and the West, Transnistria is trying to strengthen the territory’s economic performance 
and thus its de facto independent standing. 
 
The Moldovan political elite has been divided on the Transnistrian case. The nationalist 
parties are opposed to any economic concessions and would be happy to get rid of 
Transnistria, and reunify with Romania. Other more liberal pro-West parties have feared that 
Transnistrian economic collapse and social unrest would re-activate Russian influence thus 
they would prefer a long-term strategy and gradual reintegration first on economic grounds – 
 
a type of economic convergence and Europeanisation. This scenario has been in line with the 
EU policy. 
 
An EU-driven Europeanization-agenda has been applied since 2004 within the framework of 
Eastern Partnership program. The EU, with the assistance of the lobbying effort of Romania, 
has developed new strategies to support grass roots interaction and hence confidence between 
Moldovans and Transnistrians by improving local businesses, employment opportunities and 
infrastructure.51 With the 2016 elections of both the new pro-Russian Moldovan president, 
Igor Dodon, and the similarly new and pro-Russian Transnistrian president Vadim 
Krasnoselsky, an unexpected scenario emerged for rapprochement.52  
 
The ongoing Ukrainian war and the Russian occupation of the Crimea, however, changed the 
situation for this conflict and strengthened the Moldovan threat-perceptions.53 Until the war 
there existed no common border between Transnistria and Russia, which is why the role of 
Ukraine was central for the frozen conflict of Transnistria. There is also a considerable 
Ukrainian minority living in Moldova and therefore Ukraine furthered the recognition of 
Moldova’s integrity. Thus, Ukraine would likely support the withdrawal of the Russian troops 
from Transnistria. The Donbas, the breakaway provinces of Eastern Ukraine, on the other 
hand, now provide a land-connection between Russia and Transnistria, which is why lately 
also Romania started to monitor the situation with new interest. The strengthening military 
presence of Russia in the Black Sea area is a security threat that surpassed Romania’s 
traditional worries about Moldova, and brought the problem right to its own doorstep. 
 
Russia has multiplied its efforts influencing both Moldovan and Transnistrian policy because 
the Black Sea is increasingly significant for the emerging Eurasianist power. From the 
 
Russian point of view however the Black Sea region is seen as a sphere of East-West 
competition due to the presence of the EU, and most importantly the NATO. Thus, the 
strategic importance of Transnistria is rising. In addition to Russian investments, trading 
options with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union have been tempting, especially for the 
Moldovan communist and left-wing parties. The vicinity of Russia also plays against the 
advantages offered by the EU. Furthermore, the EU has shown signs of helplessness in 
pressuring Russia in the continuing crisis in Ukraine and in regard to the annexation of the 
Crimea. Russia wants to distract any rapprochement between Transnistria and the EU – 
Russian nationalists take it as a betrayal. At the same time, Russia is driving a federalization 
of Moldova that would give the Transnistrian separatists the right to veto any Moldovan 
overtures towards the West, particularly the NATO. 
 
The Moldovan and Transnistrian fluctuating interplay reveals changes in the immediate 






The Romania and Moldova display a peculiar example of the in-between strategic cultures 
discussed in this volume. In this article we demonstrated that the distinctiveness of these cases 
is basically a consequence of two interlinked aspects: on the one hand, regionally these 
countries are forced to play a special multilevel game, and secondly, they are in a uniquely 
close and continuous interaction with each other. The immediate security environment thus 
 
consists of both the Black Sea area in general and the special interconnected neighborhood of 
these states, in particular. 
 
 
Multilevel Game in the Black Sea Area 
 
Geopolitically Romania and Moldova are situated on a strategic hotspot, in the Black Sea 
area. Changes in the long-term strategic culture and short-term strategic behavior in both 
countries are affected by the diverging historical goals of Russia and the Western powers in 
the Black Sea area. It is a special in-between space because it is a particularly crisis-prone 
region where Russian and Western interests are likely to collide. For Russia, it is its 
immediate neighborhood, a territory that for about two centuries used to belong, in notable 
part, to its sphere of influence, although Ukraine lately has acted as an important buffer 
between. From the Western point of view, the Black Sea is a strategically important cross-
road to the Middle East, especially for the NATO, but also for the EU an access to Eastern 
trade and even possible energy resources. 
 
The strategic culture of Romania and Moldova has had to develop a remarkable balance 
between these bipolar forces of great powers. Integrity, however has been greatly dependent 
also on another regional factor, the interwoven concepts of the ideal state, which are also in 
collision. On the other hand, the Romanian concept would include the Republic of Moldova, 
irrespective of its multiethnic composition, which characterize also Romania itself. The 
Republic of Moldova, on the other hand, wants to maintain integrity but its notion of the ideal 
state contains the break-away region of Transnistria. 
 
 
The ideal state constitutes the core identity of these nations and primary national interest, 
based on rare political consensus. The curiosity of this situation is that Romanian and 
Moldovan strategic cultures’ goals are to realize their national interest in the above-mentioned 
space of gravity of juxta-positioned great powers. Due to the special crisis-tendency 
characteristic of the Black Sea area, this gravity is much more intensive than in most other in-
between areas. Hence, these countries’ strategic cultures are calibrated to simultaneously play 
a multilevel game. It means that in peacetime, the agenda of the ideal state gets translated into 
an innovative use of the diverging objectives of the East and the West for the country’s own 
ends. In times of crisis, such as the contemporary one in Ukraine, however, the dream of the 
ideal state gives way to a more pragmatic policy of preserving the de facto state’s integrity. 
Hence, the topic of the ideal state is downplayed and marginalized in public and strategic 
discourses. This alone provides a fairly accurate litmus paper of the sense of security that 
affects strategic behavior. 
 
 
Modus Operandi of Interactive Relations 
 
The particular interactive nature of the relations between Romania and Moldova bears huge 
relevance on how these countries’ strategic culture is formulated and what kind of strategic 
behavior models they choose to implement strategic goals. The fluctuating mental distance 
between these countries and changing patterns of integrity and belongingness are coded in 
gradual transformation of strategic culture. The intersecting concepts of the ideal state carry a 
special susceptibility to change. Transformations in any one target area, that is considered as 
the territory of the ideal state, tend to modify strategic thinking with the outcome of revising 
strategic behavior. In times of security breach or direct crisis on the regional level, this 
 
interconnectedness becomes even more conspicuous launching an immediate chain reaction 
affecting threat perceptions and altering behavior patterns. This kind of practical interactivity 
is derived from the fact that the ideal state is understood as an extended national domain. A 
security hazard in the terrain of the ideal state constitutes a peril for one’s own integrity. What 
is striking in the applied strategic behavior model of both countries is that they try to take full 
advantage of their in-between position in this geopolitically important area of the Black Sea, 
targeted by the clashing interests of great powers. It seems that the strategic behavior pattern 
consists of fast reactivity to changes in the extended national domain and in the immediate 
security environment, and includes also a special ability to link the regional worries with 
wider international concerns. 
 
It has also become obvious that Russia is well aware of the unique interactive nature of these 
countries relations. Russia has been able to take advantage especially of the multiethnic 
composition of these countries and use it as a lever stirring up political opposition and even 
grass-root level unrest to curb pro-West enthusiasm. The importance of this region, once a 
Soviet/Russian sphere of influence, has grown again in significance due to the prolonged 
Ukrainian crisis. It provided a pretext to increase Russian presence in the Black Sea area. This 
alone expands the leverage of EU-Romania and Moldova vis-à-vis the West. Therefore, 
paramount security considerations of strategic culture, such as the dream of the ideal state, 
have been successfully externalized from time to time, to be shared by influential 
international actors. Thus, greater players of the international arena (NATO, EU, USA, 
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